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                                  OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.  
 
This case requires us to apply the test for "excusable neglect" outlined 
in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick 
Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 
74 (1993). Appellant, Manus 
Corporation, urges that the Bankruptcy Court erred in refusing to grant 
relief from a judgment entered in the bankruptcy 
proceedings of O'Brien Environmental Energy, Inc.1 under principles of 
excusable neglect. The District Court affirmed the 
Bankruptcy Court's refusal to grant relief. Because we conclude that Manus 
was entitled to relief because of excusable 
neglect on its part, we will reverse.  
_______________________________________________  
1. O'Brien, the debtor in this case, changed its name to NRG Generating 
(U.S.), Inc. as of April 30, 1996, the effective date of the 
reorganization plan at issue in this case. NRG Energy, Inc., is a 
corporation which, under the successful reorganization plan, acquired 
41.86% of the stock of the reorganized debtor and 100% of the stock of the 
debtor's subsidiaries which operated certain energy projects. 
For the purposes of this opinion, appellees in this case are referred to 
as "O'Brien" or "the debtor" prior to its reorganization, and as 
"NRG" or "the reorganized debtor" after the reorganization.  
_______________________________________________  
 
                                           I. Facts 
 
Manus Corporation and O'Brien Environmental Energy, Inc. were parties to a 
landfill gas purchase and sales agreement 
dated April 2, 1986 (the "Gas Purchase Agreement"). After disputes arose 
concerning the Gas Purchase Agreement, the 
parties entered into a permanent consent decree on August 15, 1994, which 
provided that O'Brien owed Manus 
$124,094.99. 2  
 
Soon thereafter, on September 28, 1994, O'Brienfiled a petition for relief 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in 
the District of New Jersey. On Schedule F to the schedules it filed in its 
Chapter 11 proceeding, O'Brien indicated that 
Manus was the holder of an undisputed, unsecured, non-priority claim in 
the amount of $124,095.00 arising out of the 
Gas Purchase Agreement. After several reorganization plans were 
considered, the debtor's Fourth Amended and 
Restated Plan was confirmed on February 13, 1996 ("the Plan"). It is fair 
to characterize the Plan as sophisticated, written 
more in legal and technical terminology rather than layman's parlance. The 
Plan contains numerous definitional sections 
and provisions for dealing with many specific claims. It makes numerous 
references to "cure" payments relating to secured 
claims, has a very detailed system for classifying different types of 
claims, and establishes separate reserves for different 
classes of claims. In the definitional section, the term "Administrative 
Claim" is defined to include, among other things, 
amounts required to be paid under § 365 upon assumption of executory 
contracts. The Plan provides in § 8.2 that all 
executory contracts that were not rejected were to be assumed, and that 
"[a]ll payments required by Bankruptcy Code 
section 365(b)(1)(A) or (B) shall be made by Reorganized O'Brien on the 
Effective Date ... in such amount as may be 
determined, in each instance, by agreement between NRG and the non-debtor 
party to the contract or, in the case of any 
dispute, by Final Order of the Court."3  The Gas Purchase Agreement 
between Manus and the debtor was not rejected 
and, therefore, was to be assumed in the reorganization. Manus voted in 
favor of the Plan, and the effective date of, and 
closing under the Plan, was April 30, 1996.  
_________________________________________________________  
2. Although Jack Blanton, President of Manus, asserted in his 
Certification that the consent decree provides that O'Brien owed Manus 
$125,586.32 plus interest, this figure does not appear anywhere in the 
consent decree. Instead, the consent decree states at ¶ 6 that 
O'Brien owes Manus $124,094.99.  
 
3. Section 365(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:  
 
     If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired 
lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such 
     contract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of such contract 
or lease, the trustee--  
     (A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will 
promptly cure, such default. 
 
_________________________________________________________  
 
Following confirmation of the Plan, on February 20, 1996, debtor filed an 
application with the Bankruptcy Court entitled: 
"Application for Order Establishing (i) Administrative and Priority Claims 
Reserve (ii) Disputed Claims Reserve (iii) Cure 
Amounts with Respect to Claims Arising Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code 
Sections 365(b)(1) and 1124(iv) Reserve for 
Claims Subsequently Asserted with Respect to Executory Contracts or Leases 
to be Rejected and (v) Additional 
Procedures with Respect to Final Fee Applications" (the "Application"). As 
the Application is central to our resolution of 
this case, it is necessary to detail its contents and format.  
 
The Application is twelve pages long and consists of twenty-four 
paragraphs. It does not mention Manus, nor is it 
directed to any specific respondent. Rather, it is directed to "The 
Honorable Rosemarie Gambardella, United States 
Bankruptcy Court." The first several paragraphs of the Application note 
that under certain sections of the Plan, NRG is 
responsible for funding the payment of Administrative Claims and Priority 
Claims, and provides for the establishment of an 
Administrative and Priority Claims reserve in an amount to be determined 
prior to the effective date of the Plan. It also 
notes that pursuant to § 1.155 of the Plan, the Reserved Administrative 
and Cure Claim Cash Amount is fixed at 
$14,468,000.  
 
Paragraph 6 of the Application notes that "by this Application, the Debtor 
seeks a determination by the Court, and the 
entry of an appropriate Order, establishing the amount of the 
Administrative and Priority Claims reserve." At paragraph 8, 
the Application states that "by this Application, the Debtor seeks the 
entry of an appropriate Order, determining the 
maximum amount of each Disputed Claim...." In Paragraph 9, the debtor 
speaks to the reader in the second person, 
stating:  
 
If your claim has been objected to but not resolved by Final Order, is 
objected to prior to the Effective Date of the Plan, 
or is the subject of an amendment to the Debtor's schedule of liabilities 
..., the amount of the Disputed Claims Reserve 
established for your Disputed Claim will at this time be the amount of the 
unsecured claim.  
 
At paragraph 10, the Application lists certain specific creditors, and the 
amounts to be paid to each on the effective date 
to cure pre-Chapter 11 defaults and, under paragraph 11, notes that "[b]y 
this Application, the Debtor seeks the entry of 
an Order establishing that the above amounts are the amounts required to 
be paid ... on the Effective Date to cure existing 
defaults and reinstate the maturity of these Secured Claims." Similarly, 
at paragraph 12, the Application lists certain 
specific creditors and claim amounts, and at paragraph 13, indicates that 
by the Application, it seeks the entry of an order 
that the amounts stated are the amounts necessary to cure existing 
defaults and reinstate these guarantees as obligations of 
the reorganized debtor, and declaring that the payment of these amounts 
will satisfy the cure requirements of § 1124.  
 
Paragraph 14 references § 8.2 of the Plan, and states that all executory 
contracts and unexpired leases to which the 
debtor is a party that have not been rejected shall be assumed on the 
effective date. Paragraph 14 also states that all 
payments required by the Bankruptcy Code under § 365(b)(1)(A) or (B) are 
to be made by the reorganized debtor on 
that date. The Application does not reference the name of any party to 
these executory contracts, except that in 
paragraph 15, it states that "the only amount[the debtor] is required to 
pay pursuant to Section 365(b)(1)(A) or (B) to 
cure existing defaults or to compensate lessors for actual pecuniary loss 
resulting from default is the payment of $123,000 
to MDFC Equipment Leasing Corp."  
 
We quote the next paragraph, paragraph 16, verbatim:  
 
By this Application, the Debtor seeks an Order establishing that the 
payment of $123,000 to MDFC Equipment Leasing 
Corporation is the only payment required to assume the Assumed Contracts 
and declaring that payment of this amount to 
MDFC Leasing Corporation will satisfy the requirements of Section 
365(b)(1)(A) and (B) with respect to all of the 
Assumed Contracts. Any party to an Assumed Contract that fails in 
connection with this Application to assert a claim 
which arises under such Assumed Contract or with respect to which such 
party could otherwise require payment under 
Bankruptcy Code Section 365 in connection with the assumption of such 
Assumed Contract (an "Assumed Contract 
Claim") shall be deemed to have waived such Assumed Contract Claim and 
shall be precluded from later asserting such 
Assumed Contract Claim. The Debtor has served copies of the Application 
and the Notice of Motion filed herewith on all 
known parties to Assumed Contracts.  
 
When filing the Application, O'Brien also sought entry of an order 
shortening the time period for notice with respect to the 
Application and setting a hearing. The Bankruptcy Court entered an order 
on February 22 shortening the time for notice 
and setting a hearing on the Application for March 8.  
 
Mr. Blanton, President of Manus, testified that he received the 
Application, leafed through it to see if there was any 
mention of the Manus claim or claim amount and, seeing none, figured that 
the Application did not affect his rights or 
interests. He continued to assume that, pursuant to the terms of the Plan, 
his claim amount would either be agreed upon or 
would be litigated if agreement could not be reached. As a result of 
Blanton's review of the Application, he did not send it 
to his attorney, nor did anyone from Manus attend the hearing on March 8. 
Mr. Blanton later testified regarding his 
understanding of the Application:  
 
I looked at it and noted that it was addressed to 200 or so addresses and 
then went through, page by page, looking for 
the name Manus or $125,000. And I saw numerous references to other 
companies and dollars in there but no reference, 
whatsoever, to Manus or to the guarantee [Agreement]. And I concluded that 
it was a routine paperwork process, if you 
will for lack of a better term, of the bankruptcy proceedings. When the 
Judge ruled on January, I think 17th, I breathed a 
sigh of relief and thought the show is over I will get paid. And I dropped 
my defenses rather. I thought O'Brien was a 
large financially sound reasonable company, some kind of corporate 
guidelines of my years of experience for working 
with corporations. Did not work out that way.  
 
Following the hearing on the Application, the Bankruptcy Court entered an 
order, dated March 8, 1996, which includes a 
declaration that: "With respect to all other Assumed Contracts, other than 
those listed on Exhibit 'G', no amounts are 
required to be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 365(b)(1)(A) and (B) in 
order for Reorganized O'Brien to assume 
said Assumed Contracts." Exhibit G listed only MDFC Equipment Leasing 
Corporation, Southern California Edison, and 
County of Montgomery. The order provided for service on "all known parties 
to executory contracts assumed by the 
Debtor pursuant to the NRG Plan," but there is no evidence in the record 
that this order was served upon Manus, and 
Blanton attested that it was not.  
 
Thereafter, in early April 1996, Manus received a document entitled 
"Second Omnibus Objection of Official Committee 
of Unsecured Creditors to Disallow Certain Claims Scheduled by or Filed 
Against Debtor" (the "objection"). By way of 
this document, the Creditors Committee sought to expunge Manus's claim as 
listed in O'Brien's schedules. The objection 
alerted Manus to the entry of the March 8 order deeming its claim waived. 
Manus forwarded the objection to its counsel, 
Edgar Whiting, III, who immediately reviewed the bankruptcy court docket 
and files "to determine what other pleadings 
and orders had been filed relevant to the motion resulting in the March 8 
Order." Whiting contacted NRG's counsel by 
telephone on April 23, 1996 "to explain Manus's position and to attempt to 
resolve the matter consensually." Following 
this conversation, Whiting faxed a letter to NRG's counsel, as well as its 
in-house counsel, explaining Manus's position 
with regard to its claim and its understanding of the Application. Whiting 
and the Creditor's Committee agreed to adjourn 
the deadline for response to the objection so that Manus had sufficient 
time to respond. On May 17, 1996, Manus filed 
its opposition to the Creditor's Committee objection and a cross-motion 
for relief from the March 8 order under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), claiming that its failure to respond to the 
Application was the result of excusable neglect. In 
the meantime, the Plan took effect on April 30, 1996.  
 
Following a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court ruled that Manus's failure to 
respond to the Application was not excusable and 
thus, denied Manus's cross- motion. It stated, first, that the court was 
"satisfied that prejudice to the Reorganized Debtor 
requires denial of Manus' cross motion." In so finding, the court noted 
that it was undisputed that:  
 
[N]one of the cash available from the effective date funding of the NRG 
Plan, was allocated to pay the cure claim of 
Manus and there appears to be no mechanism for paying any cure claim, 
except by imposing a new obligation on the 
Reorganized Debtor. This fact constitutes in this court's view prejudice 
to the Reorganized Debtor.  
 
The court next considered that "the impact of delay on judicial 
proceedings is significant." Citing Trump Taj Mahal 
Associates v. Alibraham (In re Trump Taj Mahal Associates), 156 B.R. 928 
(Bankr.D.N.J.1993), it stated that allowing 
relief from the March 8 order after the effective date of the Plan "would 
undermine the stability of the confirmation 
process."  
 
Referencing paragraphs 14, 15, and 16 of the Application, which stated 
that failure to respond would constitute waiver of 
any potential claims, the court then noted that Manus's "excuse" for not 
responding to the Application was its failure to 
comprehend the significance of the Application; therefore, the delay in 
this case was caused by reasons within its 
reasonable control. The court believed that any deficiencies with regard 
to notice to Manus were different from those 
deficiencies noted in the landmark Supreme Court case regarding excusable 
neglect, Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. 
Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 
123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), and also that, 
although Manus acted in good faith, it must consider the fact that the 
Court in Pioneer stated that the outcome would have 
been different if it had found prejudice. The Bankruptcy Court concluded:  
 
In the instant case, allowing relief from the March 8 order would clearly 
prejudice the Reorganized Debtor. The length of 
delay is significant and would impact adversely on the judicial 
proceeding, and as previously found, it was Manus--in fact, 
it was the actions of Manus itself that caused the delay. Given these 
findings, combined with the Court's finding that 
Manus received adequate notice of the cure claim application, that the 
application was not ambiguous[,] this Court finds 
that Manus has failed to establish excusable neglect.  
 
The Bankruptcy Court also ruled that the mechanism of filing a motion to 
establish cure claims was consistent with 
Bankruptcy Rules 6006 and 9014.  
 
On appeal, the District Court affirmed the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court, 
finding that examination of the factors outlined 
in Pioneer supported the decision below. It agreed that requiring NRG to 
pay Manus's untimely claim would prejudice 
NRG "because no funds were set aside for the payment of Manus's claim." 
Such payment, it believed, would deprive 
NRG "of the fresh start to which it is entitled." The District Court 
acknowledged that the length of the delay in this case 
was not great in an absolute sense, but considered significant the timing 
of the delay, namely, that the Rule 60(b) motion 
was filed after the Plan took effect. Finally, the court found most 
convincing the fact that the cause of the delay was in 
Manus's control. It stated that "the language of the [A]pplication and the 
deadline included therein were not so 
'dramatically' ambiguous as to justify Manus's failure to respond." The 
District Court also affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's 
decision that determinations of cure claim payments could properly be 
sought by way of motion.  
 
On appeal, Manus attacks the court's refusal to grant relief as an abuse 
of discretion and argues that this case falls 
squarely under Pioneer, in that it is a case of excusable neglect, where, 
lacking prejudice, its requested relief should have 
been granted. Manus also contends that the debtor should have proceeded to 
litigate Manus's claim by way of an 
adversary proceeding, rather than by motion.  
 
                                        II. Discussion 
 Because the District Court in this case sat as an appellate court 
reviewing a final order of the Bankruptcy Court, our 
review of its determination is plenary. Interface Group-Nevada, Inc. v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. (In re Trans World 
Airlines, Inc.), 145 F.3d 124, 130 (3d Cir.1998). In reviewing the 
decision of the Bankruptcy Court, we exercise the 
same standard of review as the District Court, that is, we review the 
Bankruptcy Court's legal determinations de novo, its 
factual findings for clear error, and its exercise of discretion for abuse 
thereof. Id. A bankruptcy court abuses its 
discretion when its ruling is founded on an error of law or a 
misapplication of law to the facts. Marco v. Accent Pub. Co., 
969 F.2d 1547, 1548 (3d Cir.1992). In determining whether an error exists, 
we review de novo the District Court's 
application of the law to the facts. Id. The Bankruptcy Court had subject 
matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1334. The District Court had appellate jurisdiction over the final order 
of the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
§ 158(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) & 1291. We 
will first address the issue of whether 
determinations of cure claim payments are properly sought by the filing of 
a motion, and will then address the issue of 
excusable neglect.  
 
A. Form of Proceedings  
 
Manus argues that the debtor should have sought the relief requested in 
the Application by way of an adversary 
proceeding, commenced by a complaint, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7001.4 
Appellees counter, and the Bankruptcy 
Court and the District Court agreed, that proceeding by way of motion, as 
opposed to a separate adversary proceeding, 
was in accordance with the Bankruptcy Rules. We agree with the reasoning 
of the Bankruptcy Court and District Court 
on this issue and will affirm this aspect of the District Court's order.  
___________________________________________________  
4. Bankruptcy Rule 7001 states, in pertinent part, the following:  
 
     An adversary proceeding ... is a proceeding ... (2) to determine the 
validity, priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in 
     property, other than a proceeding under Rule 4003(d), ... (7) to 
obtain an injunction or other equitable relief, ... [or] (9) to 
     obtain a declaratory judgment relating to any of the foregoing. 
 
___________________________________________________  
 
The parties agree that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure do not 
explicitly prescribe a procedure for establishing 
cure claim amounts payable upon the assumption of executory contracts. 
They also agree that case law concerning this 
issue is lacking. Appellant argues that the Application sought both 
declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the debtor's 
relationship with Manus and thus requires an adversary proceeding under 
Rule 7001(7) and (9). Appellant also argues 
that the purpose and effect of the Application was to determine the extent 
of Manus's interest in the Gas Purchase 
Agreement and thus falls under Rule 7001(2).  
 
We do not agree with Manus that the relief sought in the Application falls 
under the auspices of Rule 7001. We do not 
read the Application as seeking "to determine the validity, priority, or 
extent of a lien or other interest in property," since 
the contract had already been assumed and thus, there was no property at 
issue. Further, we do not view the relief as 
equitable in nature, since the basic relief sought by the Application was 
not classic equitable relief, such as specific 
performance, but was the establishment of reserves and cure amounts. See 
In re Robertson, 206 B.R. 826, 829 
(Bankr.E.D.Va.1996) (determining that request for dismissal of bankruptcy 
proceedings was properly made by motion, 
and was not equitable relief, by looking at the essence of the basic 
relief sought). While many court orders in bankruptcy 
proceedings could arguably be considered as providing equitable relief, we 
do not believe that this means that every filing 
seeks "equitable relief" as referenced in Rule 7001(7), as appellant 
suggests. See In re Vance, 120 B.R. 181, 191-92 
(Bankr.N.D.Ok.1990) (stating that the distinction between an order and an 
injunction is often unclear and a matter of 
degree; holding that debtor's request to compel the trustee to conclude 
the creditor's meeting was not equitable relief). 
The reading of Rule 7001(7) appellant urges would render meaningless other 
rules that require certain requests to the 
court to be made by motion and application, contrary to general principles 
of statutory interpretation. The Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in State Bank 
v. Gledhill (In re Gledhill), 76 F.3d 1070, 1078 
(10th Cir.1996), where it applied principles of statutory construction to 
reject a broad interpretation of Rule 
7001(7),finding that such an interpretation would negate the specific 
provision for making certain requests by motion in 
Rule 60(b). The court in In re Gledhill held, therefore, that a request to 
vacate relief from an automatic stay, even though 
such a request invoked equity powers to revive a stay, was properly made 
by motion. Id.  
 
We find appellees' argument that this situation is governed by Rules 6006 
and 9014 to be a more logical and practical 
application of the Bankruptcy Rules. Rule 6006(a) states that "[a] 
proceeding to assume, reject, or assign an executory 
contract or unexpired lease, other than as part of a plan, is governed by 
Rule 9014." Bankruptcy Rule 9014 states, in 
pertinent part, the following:  
 
In a contested matter in a case under the Code not otherwise governed by 
these rules, relief shall be requested by motion, 
and reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing shall be afforded the 
party against whom relief is sought.  
 
Technically, the setting of cure claim amounts is "not otherwise governed 
by" the Bankruptcy Rules, and thus falls under 
the auspices of Rule 9014. Further, as stated by the District Court, 
"determining the amount necessary to cure existing 
defaults is necessarily related to the assumption or rejection of 
executory contracts." We conclude that, viewing Rules 
6006 and 9014 together, the Rules anticipate that this type of issue would 
be resolved by motion practice. We view Rules 
6006 and 9014 as suited to the instant situation and as providing a 
betterfit than the procedural characterization urged by 
appellant.  
 
Aside from the Rules discussed herein, Manus has not referred us to any 
authority stating that the setting of cure claim 
amounts may not proceed by motion and must proceed by way of complaint as 
an adversary proceeding. Manus has not 
convinced us that a party must commence an adversary proceeding to set 
cure claim amounts. We hold, therefore, that 
proceeding by motion in these circumstances was proper.5  
_________________________________________________________  
5. Although the parties did not raise this point, we note that O'Brien 
actually sought to set the cure claim amounts by neither adversary 
proceeding nor a motion as such, but by application. There is no 
definition of "application" in the current Bankruptcy Rules despite its 
repeated use in the Rules. Prior to the 1983 amendments, however, the 
Bankruptcy Rules contained a definition of "application," which 
included "any request to the court for relief that is not a pleading or a 
proof of claim." Bankr.R. 901(4). The Advisory Committee explained 
that an application was appropriate "[w]hen the bankrupt or trustee or 
other party seeks an order involving no adverse party." Advisory 
Committee Note to former Bankr.R. 901(4). The current Bankruptcy Rules do 
not appear to have disturbed this meaning and usage. The 
Rules generally require a motion when notice to an opposing party is 
necessary, and only allow an application if no such notice is 
required. See 6 Norton Bankr.Law & Practice 2d § 138:14 (West 1999). For 
example, the current rules allow a party to file an application for 
permission to pay a filing fee in installments, Bankruptcy Rule 1006, for 
an order of employment, Bankruptcy Rule 2014, and for a party 
seeking compensation or reimbursement for services rendered, Bankruptcy 
Rule 2016  
_________________________________________________________  
 
B. Excusable Neglect  
 
As a result of the Bankruptcy Court's March 8 order, Manus was deemed to 
have waived its claim in connection with the 
Gas Purchase Agreement and was "barred from asserting it hereafter." It is 
undisputed that Manus failed to assert its claim 
prior to the deadline set in the Application, or prior to April 30, 1996, 
the effective date of the Plan. Manus sought relief 
from the March 8 order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), made 
applicable to bankruptcy cases by 
Bankruptcy Rule 9024.6  Rule 60(b) states, in pertinent part, "[o]n motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect."  
______________________________________________________  
6. Rule 9024 provides:  
 
     Rule 60 F.R.Civ.P. applies in cases under the Code except that (1) a 
motion to reopen a case under the Code or for the 
     reconsideration of an order allowing or disallowing a claim against 
the estate entered without a contest is not subject to 
     the one year limitation prescribed in Rule 60(b), (2) a complaint to 
revoke a discharge in a chapter 7 liquidation case may be 
     filed only within the time allowed by § 727(e) of the Code, and (3) a 
complaint to revoke an order confirming a plan may be 
     filed only within the time allowed by § 1144, § 1230, or § 1330. 
 
______________________________________________________  
 
.  
 
Manus asserts that its failure to respond to the Application was the 
result of excusable neglect. Thus, we are to determine 
whether the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in failing to find 
excusable neglect. Our discussion of the issue of 
"excusable neglect" must start with a review of Pioneer Investment 
Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. 
Partnership.  
 
In Pioneer, the Supreme Court determined that a Chapter 11 creditor was 
entitled to file its proof of claim after the 
deadline set by the bar date because its failure tofile timely was the 
result of "excusable neglect" within the meaning of Rule 
9006. 507 U.S. at 398-99. In so holding, the Court explicitly rejected the 
argument that excusable neglect applies only to 
those situations where the failure to comply is a result of circumstances 
beyond the creditor's reasonable control. Id. at 
388. It acknowledged that the mere use of the word "neglect" encompassed 
"omissions caused by carelessness," but took 
comfort in the fact that parties would still be deterred from ignoring 
court ordered deadlines since the neglect must be 
"excusable." Id. at 395. It stated that determining whether neglect is 
excusable is an "equitable" determination that "tak[es] 
account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission." 
Id. Such an equitable determination, it reasoned, 
is consistent with the policies underlying Chapter 11, as "Chapter 11 
provides for reorganization with the aim of 
rehabilitating the debtor and avoiding forfeitures by creditors." Id. at 
389. "In overseeing this ... process, the bankruptcy 
courts are necessarily entrusted with broad equitable powers to balance 
the interests of the affected parties, guided by the 
overriding goal of ensuring the success of the reorganization." Id. To 
make the excusable neglect determination, the Court 
listed four factors for courts to consider: "the danger of prejudice to 
the debtor, the length of the delay and its potential 
impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including 
whether it was within the reasonable control of the 
movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Id. at 395.  
 
Under the facts of Pioneer, the Court noted that the failure to file on 
time was inadvertent and in good faith, as counsel 
was not aware of the bar date. It found that there was no danger of 
prejudice to the debtor or the administration of 
judicial proceedings, as the claim, though untimely, was accounted for in 
the reorganization plan and was filed prior to the 
plan's effective date. Finally, the Court found relevant that notice of 
the bar date "was outside the ordinary course" in that 
it was not, as it should be, "prominently announced and accompanied by an 
explanation of its significance." Id. at 398. 
Instead, the "inconspicuous placement" of the deadline--a single sentence 
in a boilerplate document, that, according to its 
title, related to a creditor's meeting--"left a 'dramatic ambiguity' in 
the notification." Id. For these reasons, the Court found 
that there was excusable neglect and allowed the late filing.  
 
Although the Bankruptcy Court engaged in the Pioneer analysis to guide its 
excusable neglect determination,7 we believe 
it erred in its analysis of prejudice, the reason for the delay, and the 
extent of the delay.8  We will analyze each of these 
factors in turn, and start with the issue of prejudice, which seemed 
paramount in the decision of the Bankruptcy Court and 
the District Court.  
________________________________________________________  
7. The phrase "excusable neglect" appears not only in Rule 9006(b) but in 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6(b), 13(f), and 60(b), Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(b), and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a). The Supreme Court referred to each of these rules in 
construing the "excusable neglect" analysis in Pioneer. Pioneer, 
therefore, is commonly understood to provide guidance not just with 
regard to Rule 9006, but in other bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy contexts 
discussing the issue of excusable neglect. See, e.g., Midwest 
Employers Casualty Co. v. Williams, 161 F.3d 877, 880 n. 6 (5th Cir.1998); 
Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 998 (11th 
Cir.1997); Canfield v. Van Atta Buick, 127 F.3d 248, 250 (2d Cir.1997) 
(per curiam); Pratt v. Philbrook, 109 F.3d 18, 19 (1st Cir.1997); Robb v. 
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 122 F.3d 354, 359 (7th Cir.1997); Committee for 
Idaho's High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 825 n. 4 (9th 
Cir.1996); Thompson v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 76 F.3d 530, 533 (4th 
Cir.1996). Thus, the Pioneer analysis applies in the context of 
a Rule 60(b) motion, as in this case.  
 
8. There is no dispute that Manus acted in good faith. The Bankruptcy 
Court held that it did, and appellees do not argue to the contrary.  
________________________________________________________  
 
1. Prejudice  
 
The Bankruptcy Court held that prejudice to the reorganized debtor 
requires denial of Manus's motion for relief since 
"none of the cash available from the effective date funding of the NRG 
plan, was allocated to pay the cure claim of Manus 
and there appears to be no mechanism for paying any cure claim, except by 
imposing a new obligation on the 
Reorganized Debtor." The Bankruptcy Court's prejudice analysis seemed to 
hinge solely on the fact that by virtue of 
Manus's failure to respond to the Application, its claim was not accounted 
for in the funding of the Plan. We believe that 
Pioneer requires a more detailed analysis of prejudice which would account 
for more than whether the Plan set aside 
money to pay the claim at issue. Otherwise, "virtually all late filings 
would be condemned by this factor." Manousoff v. 
Macy's Northeast, Inc. (In re R.H. Macy & Co.), 166 B.R. 799, 802 
(Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994) (holding that the depletion 
of resources otherwise available for timely filed claims is not 
prejudice).  
 
Though Pioneer lists prejudice as a factor in the excusable neglect 
analysis, it gives us little guidance as to what prejudice 
actually is in this context, and we have not had occasion to explore this 
issue. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
and several bankruptcy courts, however, have considered the Pioneer 
analysis and have grappled with what constitutes 
prejudice in the bankruptcy context. In Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rogers 
(In re Eagle Bus Mfg., Inc.), 62 F.3d 730 (5th 
Cir.1995), creditors sought leave to file untimely proofs of claims. 
Although these claims were allegedly not accounted for 
in the confirmed plan, the court held that there was no prejudice since 
the "plan was negotiated and approved after [the 
debtor] had notice of these claims." Id. at 737. The court found the fact 
that the debtor believed that the claims would be 
barred as untimely insufficient to constitute prejudice. In In re Keene 
Corp., 188 B.R. 903, 912-13 
(Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1995), the court acknowledged that the determination of 
prejudice involved "a certain amount of crystal 
ball gazing," and then listed several factors to consider in a Pioneer 
prejudice analysis, including: the size of the claim with 
respect to the rest of the estate; whether allowing the late claim would 
have an adverse impact on the judicial 
administration of the case; whether the plan was filed or confirmed with 
knowledge of the existence of the claim; the 
disruptive effect that the late filing would have on the plan or upon the 
economic model upon which the plan was based; 
and whether allowing the claim would open the floodgates to other similar 
claims. In In re Papp International, Inc., 189 
B.R. 939, 945 (Bankr.D.Neb.1995), the court relied on a Webster's 
dictionary definition of prejudice: a claim is 
prejudicial if it will "injure or damage the debtor." The court considered 
damage to other creditors in the form of a 
reduced recovery as a consideration in determining prejudice. The court 
determined in that case, however, that there was 
no prejudice in allowing the late claim, stating:  
 
If the IRS's proof of claim had been timely filed, the bankruptcy estate 
would have had to either object to the claim or 
provide for the claim in the plan of reorganization. If the claim is 
permitted to befiled late, the debtor and other interested 
parties are in the same position as if the proof of claim had been filed 
on time.  
Id.  
 
We find In re Pettibone Corp., 162 B.R. 791 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1994), to be 
especially informative, since, in that case, the 
prejudice determination assessed prejudice to the reorganized debtor after 
confirmation of the plan. In that case, the 
reorganized debtor argued that it would be prejudiced by allowing a late 
claim, since allowing such claims would cause it 
to face increased insurance premiums and expend significant employee time. 
The court rejected this argument, stating:  
 
Pettibone is now a feisty, stable, publicly-held manufacturer and active 
participant in the competitive commercial world. 
The evidence did not show that rising insurance premiums would force 
Pettibone back into bankruptcy, materially affect 
its solvency, or adversely impact at all on consummation of its confirmed 
Plan (which appears to be fully consummated 
except for the continuing claims litigation). Indeed, it was not even 
shown that a future increase in premiums would 
comprise a significant increase in Pettibone's cost of doing business. 
Moreover, the evidence did not establish that any 
premium increase would materially differ from the usual impact that other 
injury claims will have on its premiums for 
liability insurance under normal business conditions. Nor did Pettibone 
establish that the impact on employee time for 
helping defend the ... claims would differ from the burden on any company 
of its size to aid in defense of insured claims.  
Id. at 805. The court was not concerned with the reorganized debtor being 
saddled with costs from the bankruptcy since 
the "fresh start" concept does not apply to corporate debtors. Id. at 804. 
The court concluded that Pettibone had suffered 
no "material prejudice," such as loss of the ability to defend against the 
late claims. Id. at 805.  
 
Determinations regarding prejudice in other contexts also shed light on 
the prejudice analysis. In Feliciano v. Reliant 
Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653, 656- 57 (3d Cir.1982), in a Rule 60(b) non-
bankruptcy context, we stated that the cost of 
enforcing a judgment later vacated and the delay in realizing satisfaction 
on a claim "rarely serves to establish the degree of 
prejudice sufficient to prevent the opening of a default judgment." 
Instead, one must assert "loss of available evidence, 
increased potential for fraud or collusion, or substantial reliance upon 
the judgment." Id. at 657. Other circuits too have 
held that prejudice is not merely the loss of an advantageous position, 
but must be something more closely tied to the 
merits of the issue. In Pratt v. Philbrook, 109 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.1997), 
three weeks after a settlement order of dismissal 
became final, plaintiff sought to have the dismissal vacated and the case 
reopened. With regard to the issue of prejudice, 
the court stated:  
 
From our vantage point it is difficult to see what cognizable prejudice, 
in the sense, for example, of lost evidence, would 
come to the defendant from reopening the case. Of course, it is always 
prejudicial for a party to have a case reopened 
after it has been closed advantageously by an opponent's default. But we 
do not think that is the sense in which the term 
"prejudice" is used in Pioneer.  
Id. at 22.  
 
We note that, in the case before us, the opinions of the Bankruptcy Court 
and the District Court contain no discussion of 
a factual basis to support the finding of prejudice. As the cases we 
reference demonstrate, prejudice is not an imagined or 
hypothetical harm; a finding of prejudice should be a conclusion based on 
facts in evidence. In assessing whether there 
was prejudice in this case, certain facts of record are indeed relevant: 
the debtor listed Manus's claim as an undisputed, 
unsecured claim in the amount of $124,095.00 in its schedules; O'Brien's 
contract with Manus was to be assumed, and 
the Plan stated with regard to such contracts that all payments required 
by § 365(b)(1)(A) or (B) were to be made on the 
effective date; NRG's counsel was contacted prior to the effective date of 
the Plan and advised of the nature of Manus's 
claim and Manus's intent to pursue such claim. Thus, there is no question 
that O'Brien and NRG were aware of Manus's 
claim, and its amount, and that O'Brien had not contested its existence. 
This is not a case where the debtor was surprised 
or caught unaware by the assertion of a claim that it had not anticipated. 
See Greyhound Lines, Inc., 62 F.3d at 738 
(stating that whether debtor had a reason to expect the claim was relevant 
to the prejudice inquiry). To the contrary, since 
the Plan obligated NRG to pay all past-due amounts under the Gas Purchase 
Agreement, we can fairly assume that it 
actually planned to pay this claim.  
 
Also relevant are the fact that the debtor's operations--admittedly 
healthy at the time of confirmation--were to continue 
under the auspices of NRG, and the Plan's establishment of reserves was 
merely a designation of sources of funds rather 
than finite "pots" for payments to other creditors. Appellees have 
acknowledged, both in oral argument and in a letter 
submission to the court, that payment of Manus's claim would not force the 
return of the amounts already paid out under 
the confirmed Plan, or affect the distribution to creditors and equity 
holders. The reorganized debtor is a large, successful 
company with annual revenues and earnings in the millions and the payment 
of this claim would not jeopardize the success 
of the reorganization. Cf. In re Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc., 189 B.R. 
331, 336 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1995) (finding 
prejudice where payment of the late claim could jeopardize the reorganized 
debtor's survival). There has been no 
allegation, let alone evidence in the record, that payment of the cure 
claim of Manus by NRG would pose any problem, 
actually or legally, or would adversely impact any of appellees. Finally, 
to the extent NRG argues that allowance of this 
claim would open the floodgates to other future claims against them, NRG 
has not alleged that any other creditor 
promptly sought to be excused from the March 8 order so as to now be 
entitled to relief on the basis of excusable 
neglect.  
 
Considering all of these facts, we cannot see how any of the appellees 
before us would be prejudiced, in the legal sense, 
by NRG's having to pay Manus's claim--a claim which the debtor had already 
planned to pay by the terms of its own 
Plan.9  It seems instead that the only prejudice that would result from 
allowing the reorganized debtor to assume the 
contract with Manus without curing this claim as required by the 
Bankruptcy Court would be the reorganized debtor's 
loss of a windfall. Thus, wefind no real prejudice in this fact pattern.  
______________________________________________________  
9. We note, however, that our ruling is limited to the issue before us 
regarding the court's refusal to grant relief from the order of deemed 
waiver of Manus's claim. We do not rule as to the nature or amount of 
Manus's cure claim.  
______________________________________________________  
 
2. Reason for Delay  
 
The Bankruptcy Court was also influenced because the cause for delay was 
within Manus's control, since it admittedly 
received the Application advising of the hearing and Manus's need to 
assert its claim, but chose not to read it carefully or 
to ask counsel for guidance. While it is certainly relevant that the delay 
in this case was due in part to this lack of care on 
the part of Manus, the concept of excusable neglect clearly anticipates 
this, i.e., neglect on the part of the one seeking to 
be excused. See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 388. Thus, this is not determinative 
to the inquiry. The Bankruptcy Court should 
not have limited its focus to Manus's conduct. An examination of O'Brien's 
role in the mishap is also essential to a 
determination of whether Manus's neglect was excusable. See Chemetron 
Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 350 (3d 
Cir.1995) (stating that the district court erred in failing to consider 
the debtor's role in the creditor's delay); Atlantic 
Richfield Co. v. Sharon Steel Corp. (In re Sharon Steel Corp.), 110 B.R. 
205, 206 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1990) (stating that 
the debtor was just as much at fault as the creditor for failing to 
consider its claim and thus was equally at fault for the 
delay). As in Pioneer, the delay in this case resulted from a creditor's 
lack of notice of a deadline. Having reviewed the 
record, including the Application and the circumstances surrounding its 
service upon Manus, we conclude that O'Brien's 
modus operandi does not leave it blameless regarding Manus's failure to 
appreciate the significance of the Application. 
Before it sent out the Application, O'Brien knew that Manus's claim would 
be impacted by it, and yet, in choosing the 
format of the Application and in noticing the March 8 hearing, never 
addressed a notice to it or referenced its claim. The 
Application was addressed to the Bankruptcy Judge and sought a court order 
establishing reserves and cure amounts.10  
____________________________________________________  
10. We note that, as discussed in footnote 5, an application is to be used 
when there is no party to whom the pleading is directed. While 
Manus does not rely on this as an excuse for its inadvertence, it would 
have been entirely understandable if the debtor's proceeding by 
way of application had caused it to assume that the Application would not 
include an objection to its claim.  
____________________________________________________  
 
While it was not improper for the Bankruptcy Court to distinguish this 
case from Pioneer, since, as opposed to the one 
inconspicuous sentence announcing the bar date in Pioneer, the Application 
addressed executory contracts in three 
paragraphs, the Bankruptcy Court should have also considered that these 
three paragraphs were paragraphs fourteen, 
fifteen, and sixteen, that they were buried in the middle of a twelve page 
document, and that neither the document nor any 
attachment listed the relevant contracting parties' names or claims. The 
title of the Application did not call attention to the 
fact that it contained information critical to Manus's interests. Thus, 
although three paragraphs of the Application 
addressed the assumed executory contracts, we conclude that NRG did not 
provide sufficient notice to Manus that the 
Application was either an objection to Manus's claim or was seeking to 
determine Manus's claim once and for all. One 
would not normally assume that an "application" directed to the court 
seeking to "establish reserves" would be the vehicle 
by which the debtor would be seeking, as it said it would in the Plan, to 
have the court resolve a dispute relating to a 
claim.  
 
Thus, although Blanton was careless in not reading the Application 
carefully, and, specifically, paragraphs fourteen 
through sixteen, his neglect is excusable since it was caused at least in 
part by O'Brien's own failure to properly alert 
Manus that this "application" was really an objection to its claim. At the 
very least, the Application should have listed 
those who obviously had executory contract cure claims that would be 
affected, as it did in other paragraphs naming 
creditors and amounts. Instead, with respect to executory contracts, it 
listed only the one contract for which the debtor 
was willing to concede the cure claim. We find that Manus's failure to 
realize the impact of the Application on its claims 
was the result, at least in part, of O'Brien's failure to properly alert 
and notify Manus that O'Brien was objecting to 
Manus's claim, and that Manus's claim would be waived if it did not act.  
 
3. Length of Delay  
 
Finally, we consider the length of the delay and its impact on the 
judicial proceedings. The Bankruptcy Court declared the 
delay and its impact "significant," because the requested relief in this 
case occurred after the effective date of the Plan and 
thus "would undermine the stability of the confirmation process." The 
Bankruptcy Court, however, did not really address 
the length of the delay. The actual delay was approximately two months, 
and takes on significance mainly because of the 
intervening occurrence of the effective date of the Plan on April 30, 
1996. As the District Court noted, the delay 
associated with Manus's requesting relief from the March 8 order--which 
occurred approximately ten weeks after the 
March 8 hearing, approximately four weeks after Manus was aware that its 
claim was waived, and approximately two 
weeks after the effective date of the Plan--is not significant in an 
absolute sense. Further, it would have been only seven 
weeks' delay if O'Brien or NRG had reacted to the problem immediately when 
notified by Manus's attorney on April 23, 
before the Plan became effective. In addition, the detrimental impact of 
this delay is as much due to O'Brien's strategic 
decision to not object to or litigate Manus's claim until the fairly tight 
time frame between confirmation and the effective 
date of the Plan. Here, the delay factor in the excusable neglect inquiry 
should not be held to turn entirely on the urgency 
created by the debtor's time line. Such an approach makes the two month 
delay seem significant, whereas a similar delay, 
or even a much longer delay in a case where the debtor proceeds more 
expeditiously to resolve outstanding claims under 
its contracts, or allows itself more time between confirmation and closing 
under its plan, would be insignificant. See 
Chemetron Corp., 72 F.3d at 350 (remanding to determine excusable neglect 
where motion to file late claim occurred 
two years after plan was confirmed); Greyhound Lines, Inc., 62 F.3d at 740 
(finding excusable neglect where delay was 
six to eight months). Thus, although it is proper to consider the delay's 
effect on the judicial proceedings, Pioneer teaches 
that we should consider the length of the delay in absolute terms, which 
the Bankruptcy Court did not do in this case.  
 
We conclude that, considering the legal parameters of the applicable 
tests--namely, prejudice, the reason for the delay, 
and the extent of the delay--as well as the facts of this case and the 
equitable nature of the determination as outlined in 
Pioneer, the Bankruptcy Court erred in determining that Manus was not 
entitled to relief from the March 8 order based 
upon excusable neglect.  
 We will affirm the District Court's ruling that the debtor's request for 
the establishment of a cure amount could properly 
proceed by way of motion practice, but will reverse the District Court's 
ruling denying Manus relief from the March 8 
order. We will remand this case to the Bankruptcy Court for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
